Jose Ramos-Horta

In 1975, Jose Ramos-Horta fled his beloved homeland, East Timor, when Indonesia invaded and annexed the small island between Java and Australia. Since then, he has worked tirelessly so the world will not forget East Timor under the closed and brutal rule of Indonesia.

The island’s plight finally received world attention when the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Ramos-Horta and another little-known activist, Roman Catholic Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, for their work to bring peace to East Timor. More than 200,000 East Timorese have died--one-third of the population--as a result of war, terror, starvation and epidemics. Both men advocate self-determination for the island.

Belo, 49, remains on East Timor, a prominent figure among its largely Roman Catholic population and a calming influence amid the tensions between Indonesian forces and the local population. Ramos-Horta, in exile in Sydney, Australia, continues to press for a U.N.-sponsored referendum for East Timor. The United Nations does not acknowledge Indonesia’s annexation of the former Portuguese colony, and classifies it under Portuguese sovereignty as a non-self-governing territory with the right to self-determination.

Ramos-Horta knows the United Nations well. He worked at its New York headquarters for 13 years for the government of Mozambique, which granted him a diplomatic passport after he fled East Timor. He moved to Australia in 1989. “I had had enough of the United States. I was burned out, broke, almost had a nervous breakdown.”

Today, it’s hard to imagine the 51-year-old Ramos-Horta as the former leftist guerrilla who was named East Timor’s foreign minister 22 years ago. Low key and professorial in demeanor and dress (bow tie and wire-rimmed glasses), he fits right into the University of New South Wales, where he has developed a diplomacy-training program. His 18-year-old son lives in Mozambique with his ex-wife, Anna Pessoa, a judge in that country.

Ramos-Horta fears that East Timor is being held hostage to U.S. economic interests in Indonesia. But, “I must also say we are grateful to the Clinton administration, which even before the Nobel Peace Prize announcement, made East Timor an international issue and raised awareness in this country,” he said during a recent conversation in Los Angeles. Clinton has called the East Timor situation “unconscionable” and, in March 1993, the United States backed, for the first time, a U.N. resolution critical of Indonesian human-rights abuses in East Timor. Nevertheless, the United States accepts Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor even as it acknowledges that no valid act of self-determination has taken place.

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Question: Why is a conflict on a small Asian island so important to the entire international community?

Answer: Each of us, be it an American in Los Angeles or an American in Alaska or the British in Sheffield, England, should have some moral responsibilities, concerns about other fellow human beings . . . It’s a question of conscience, particularly when you are secure, when you are safe in your home in your country. The least someone in the United States can do is to care about those who are suffering, particularly suffering as a result, directly or indirectly, of some U.S. role.

Q. How would you characterize the Clinton administration’s policy toward East Timor? You once described U.S. policy as “a complex contradiction.” What did you mean?

A. I understand the constraints imposed on the U.S. by the necessities of realpolitik. Indonesia is a country of 200 million with enormous wealth. We should not have any illusions that countries, the U.S. included, would make moral considerations a primary source of foreign policy. But, at the same time, a country like the United States, which is founded on certain ideals and being the only surviving superpower in the world, cannot simply relinquish these moral responsibilities and surrender to mere economic interests or make these principles totally hostage to realpolitik. In the case of the United States, it has expressed concern to the Indonesia side about human rights and East Timor; but, at the same time, it has provided Indonesia the same tools that cause the human-rights violations over which the U.S. is worried. The U.S., along with the United Kingdom, are the two largest arms suppliers to Indonesia.

Fortunately, I must also say we are grateful to the Clinton administration, which, even before the Nobel Peace Prize, raised awareness in this country. It took some modest steps in putting pressure on Indonesia, cutting some limited amounts of weapons . . . .

But this is very little in proportion to U.S. influence and its huge economic ties with Indonesia. These economic ties give the United States strong leverage . . . . That’s why I believe the U.S. could be more active, without upsetting the strategic interest it has in the region.

Q: Do you think the current problems the Clinton administration is having with political campaign contributions--a good chunk of which have come from Indonesian companies or individuals affiliated with Indonesia--help the East Timor situation or detract from it?

A: If anything, I would believe that the administration would have to show the American people and the Congress that these contributions, whatever they are--I’m not stating whether they actually exist, whether they were wrong or right, whether they were in conflict with certain rules and ethics, all I’m saying is that whatever they are--would compel this U.S. administration to prove to the Congress and the American people that in no way are they affecting a moral and objective view of U.S. policy in regard to the tragedy in East Timor.

Q: What has been the international response to East Timor since the Nobel Peace Prize? And where do you see it needing to go next?

A: Two issues here. One, no matter the policy of the U.S. or any country in regard to Indonesia or East Timor, the East Timorese are going to continue the fight. We have shown in the past 21 years that we are able to survive every attempt to crucify us. We survived five American presidents--I mention this because they provided the weapons to Indonesia. The Nobel Peace Prize has given even greater hope and determination to the people of East Timor.

Second, it raised awareness in Indonesia itself, where there are growing sympathies and support for an independent East Timor. The current regime under President Suharto has aged and cannot live eternally. At some point, Suharto will follow the natural fate of Ferdinand Marcos, Deng Xiaoping and Kim Il Sung. There is an excellent window of opportunity for the U.S. to work on two fronts: to compel Indonesia to move on political reforms, open up its political system, engage in dialogue with the opposition . . . so that Indonesia can move into the 21st century in a stable way. On the East Timor front, the U.S. does not have to take sides in terms of supporting independence. But it should not support an annexation, which it knows to be illegal.

The U.S. could pursue a positive neutrality approach. What we mean is: It should simply support holding an internationally supervised referendum, whereby the people of East Timor would freely choose.

Q: How could the U.S. compel Indonesia to have a more open political system?

A: The global village and the global economy in which we are all entangled means that Indonesia cannot claim that the affairs of Indonesia are its own, a matter of exclusive domestic jurisdiction--because human rights are universal and transcend boundaries. Secondly, the dynamic multilateral trade that exists, with hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars invested in Indonesia’s economy, gives a country like the U.S. a huge stake, an authority to tell Indonesia that it is in our interest that you change.

If Indonesia does not change and disintegrates, as Iran did 15 years ago, tens of billions of [dollars of] economic interests will be erased, and it would affect millions of jobs in the region. Instability in Indonesia would affect Malaysia, the Philippines, Hong Kong . . . across the region.

Q: If you could have an ideal framework for East Timor, what would it be?

A: I wouldn’t say I think about the ideal scenario. The realistic scenario is we have to wait for Suharto to depart from the scene, either voluntarily leaving office or of natural death or graciously pushed out by the more reformist Indonesian military people. That would open up immense possibilities for a more serious dialogue with the East Timorese, because whoever comes after Suharto, even a new military leadership, would have its reputation, its hands clean of the East Timor conflict. Because of all the people who were involved in the planning and execution of the war in 1975, Suharto is the only one alive. So it’s a question of his own reputation alone, not the interests of the republic that is at stake.

In that scenario, we would be prepared to be flexible and creative to enable Indonesia to disengage from East Timor gradually without loss of face, with honor and dignity, starting with a total demilitarization of the territory, release of all prisoners, end of torture. Then, followed by a general, limited autonomy, whereby East Timorese are in power to run their own territory without Indonesia losing any of its appearance of sovereignty over the territory. But, in the end, there would have to be a referendum.

In that scenario I’m convinced the overwhelming majority of the people of East Timor, 99.9%, would vote for independence. We East Timorese have to be realistic, in the sense that we have to move slowly, step by step, without rushing, so that there is no upheaval, no breakdown of the institutions, whatever they are. So East Timorese who serve in the Indonesian administration in East Timor do not fear being left out or, worse, prosecuted for collaborating. We have to offer a hand of reconciliation.

Q: Have there been any efforts at organizing a boycott against Indonesia similar to what is happening in Burma, where a number of international companies have pulled out?

A: The state legislature of Massachusetts has a (pending) bill aimed at prohibiting companies in that state from doing any business with Indonesia and to withdraw billions of dollars in pension funds in investments and securities in Indonesia. Rep. Patrick Kennedy (D-R.I.) introduced a bill in Congress to cut off about $26 million [in annual military assistance] to Indonesia, as well as $600,000 in military training.

That is not a major amount, but it has enormous political symbolism. Besides, it would be very difficult for the U.S. administration to justify to American taxpayers giving $600,000 or $26 million to Indonesia when the Suharto family has a fortune estimated to be $40 billion . . . .

It would also be difficult to explain that a country so wealthy that it gives so much in contributions to U.S. campaign politics should not receive this kind of money. This bill by Patrick Kennedy has strong practical and moral cover and a strong chance of passing in the House. It will be difficult for any congressman, after the Lippo scandal, to come out to object to Patrick Kennedy’s bill.

Q: Do you have a definition for what the Western world calls Asian values? Do you think they are so “incompatible” with democracy?

A: It is not the Western world but certain Asian rulers--like Lee Kwan Yew, Li Peng and Suharto--who coined this phrase “Asian values.” What they understand or try to portray as Asian values is in contradiction with the universally accepted rule of law, of freedom from torture, freedom from persecution, freedom of expression and so on.

What they are trying to say with “Asian values” is that, while in Europe and the U.S., individuals are protected from torture, from being shot, from being kidnapped for political reasons, these leaders should be able to do so with impunity. Wei Jingsheng of China. He is Asian. He is fighting for democracy, for the rule of law in China. Aung San Suu Kyi also is Asian. Cori Aquino and her late husband, [Benigno S.] Aquino are Asians who fought for democracy in the Philippines, and prevailed. The thousands of people in South Korea who, over the years, demonstrated in the streets of Kwangju and demanded democracy and finally prevailed are Asians.

What is ironic is that these speeches we hear today by certain Asian leaders, saying that human rights and democracy are a Western capitalistic concept, are exactly the same kind of rhetoric we heard in the ‘60s and ‘70s from the mouths of Stalinist leaders in the Soviet Union [and] in Central and Eastern Europe.

In the ‘60s, the conflict was between the West and others who argued that human rights were universal and the Stalinist concept of collective rights, which were supposed to supersede or be placed over individual rights.

These anti-communist regimes today in Asia have hijacked the Stalinist definition of conflict of the ‘60s and ‘70s. It is, essentially, an opportunistic argument. Those who argue it, support it, have a commonality, and that is they are all autocratic, dictator, fascist-like regimes.