Europe Must Bear Its Share

Since NATO was created half a century ago, the United States has regularly complained that the European allies don’t shoulder their fair share of the transatlantic military burden. The Kosovo war made matters worse, as the U.S. Air Force flew about 80% of all allied missions over Yugoslavia. Now the Europeans are vowing that, this time, they will stop lagging behind. Whether they redeem this pledge will have a profound impact on the alliance, European unity and transatlantic relations.

Last week, NATO chose a new secretary-general, British Defense Secretary George Robertson, in part because he brings back to the job a strong commitment to Atlanticism, along with a belief that Europe needs to do more for its own security. This dual perspective, coupled with his leadership in producing allied success over Kosovo, comes none too soon.

The Kosovo war revealed a key weakness in the “new NATO,” as it refocuses its attention from Cold War containment to projecting military power--whether for peacekeeping in the Balkans or possible action beyond Europe, as envisioned by the United States. Only the U.S. has the full range of modern weaponry and, equally important, the complex computer and information technology to make it work. Not surprisingly, a war in Yugoslavia designed to keep allied casualties to a minimum required reliance on air power, precision-guided munitions and the ability to manage the high-tech battle. That meant the U.S. had to bear the brunt of the fighting.

In the aftermath, Washington is putting increased pressure on the European allies to upgrade their military forces by implementing NATO’s new defense capabilities initiative, agreed to at its Washington summit in April. The alternative, the U.S. argues, could be increased demands on Capitol Hill for America to do less militarily in and around Europe, even if the allies fail to do more.

The Europeans’ pledge to do better at burden-sharing is reinforced by a parallel development: a major push to accelerate European integration. The European Union has approved a plan to create its own “common foreign and security policy.” It has enlisted the current NATO secretary-general, Javier Solana, to be charged with making some common sense out of 15 different national approaches to the outside world.

But to be serious and effective, this new EU effort also implies being able, at some point, to undertake independent military action. To this end, the EU is creating a “European Security and Defense Identity,” or ESDI, within NATO, designed to meet security challenges in Europe in the event the United States, for whatever reason, chose not to take part. To avoid the expensive and wasteful duplication of creating two sets of European military capabilities--one for NATO, one for ESDI--the United States and its allies have already agreed that the Europeans can “borrow” some of NATO’s assets: officers and commanders, the alliance’s new Combined Joint Task Force headquarters and even some specialized military equipment unique to the United States. The result can be a Europe able to take on added military responsibilities.

All this is good news--if it works. European ambition is at its peak; but not so the commitment of resources. Among the allies, only Britain has done much to bring its military forces into the digital age--another argument for making Robertson the NATO secretary-general. Germany has announced major cuts in its military spending. France champions ESDI, in part as a counterweight to U.S. influence on the Continent, but lags well behind in military modernization. And few other allies have more than a rudimentary capability to operate in a high-tech military environment.

Collectively, the Europeans spend about two-thirds as much as the United States on defense; but for their money they get only a fraction of U.S. military capability. Meanwhile, European defense industries have only just begun the rationalization and consolidation across borders they must have to mimic the economies in research and production already attained by U.S. companies.

The resulting tension between European rhetoric and reality poses significant risks, including the possibility that the U.S. will start thinking of doing less militarily in Europe on the false assumption that the Europeans, outside of NATO, will be able to do more anytime soon. That conclusion would be unfortunate, given that the Kosovo war showed that, in a minimal-casualty military campaign, Europe’s reliance on the United States has actually increased.

Once again, burden-sharing across the Atlantic has come front and center in allied debate. The stakes are higher than in the past. The EU’s ambition to pursue integration in foreign policy and defense cannot admit a visible failure of ESDI. NATO’s military effectiveness cannot be sustained if the forces of different allied nations become progressively less able to work with one another. And the United States cannot be given the impression that, in some circumstances, it is more willing to meet security challenges in Europe than those who live there--especially when it faces competing military needs elsewhere, notably in the Pacific.

Getting right the issue of transatlantic defense relations must underpin the rest of NATO’s complex agenda; there is no substitute for political cohesion between Washington and the European allies. Robertson has to broker the deals to strengthen allied military capabilities and achieve a fair sharing of responsibilities. For NATO, the European Union, and transatlantic security relations, a lot is riding on the success of his leadership.